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Introduction
The field of the history of intellectual property that a quarter of a
century ago was sparsely populated is a burgeoning one. A rich body of
historical work of many methodological stripes examines many aspects
of intellectual property in various periods.1 The purpose of this essay is
to pause and ask what is the point of writing the history of this field
and how it should be approached. These questions are aimed not at
methodology in the technical sense, but rather at the overarching
purpose of the enterprise and the resultant proper organizing theoretical
and orienting frame for its pursuit.
I argue that there is a strong drive in this subfield for producing
scholarship within a frame of origin history. Origin history is geared
toward uncovering the true and accurate meaning of a legal rule,
concept, or practice at one discrete moment in the past. This may seem
to be pure and simple history writing: discovering “what things were
really like.” Nevertheless, origin history, like all history writing, has a
specific orienting frame. Its guiding principle is locating true and
genuine meaning in a privileged past moment. Such perspective assumes
constancy—that things are or at least should be as they were—or at
†

William C. Conner Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. I
thank Lionel Bently, Ron Harris, William Forbath and participants of the
symposium on the Rise of Intellectual Property for useful comments and
suggestions. I am particularly indebted to Talha Syed for illuminating
conversations and invaluable feedback.

1.

See William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History
of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States, in 1 Intellectual
Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law 72, § II (David Vaver
ed., 2006).
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the very least, takes little interest in change. The tacit claim of origin
history is twofold: to explain and justify. The assumption is that the
meaning discovered in the relevant past moment both offers a historical
explanation and justifies present choices. Both are false, but my focus
here is on the failure of the former.
Laying origin history aside, I discuss an alternative frame for
writing intellectual property history: the, so called, new history of
capitalism. Taking root in American history departments in the last
two decades, this approach is fueled by a renewed interest in studying
the history of economic relations with an emphasis on the new and
distinct system of capitalism.2 There is a close fit between this approach
and historical research of intellectual property. This fit is rooted in the
fact that the appearance of the field of intellectual property, a distinctly
modern construct, coincided with and was an element of the rise of
capitalism.3 There is, however, also danger lurking in a common under–
standing of several central features of the new history of capitalism
approach. The danger is that overemphasis on contingency and
constructivism is likely to lead to the conclusion that capitalism is
simply whatever random collection of features that political struggles
and historical accidents happened to produce. This, in turn, reduces
history into description and denies it any explanatory force. By
reducing a dynamic and developing set of relations into a constant
thing, origin history reifies its object of study. By reducing it to a list
of historical accidents, contingency history causes its object to
disintegrate.
This essay concludes by suggesting that an attractive frame for
studying the history of intellectual property is the history of capitalism
shorn of its strong contingency drive. Within this frame capitalism,
rather than seen as a random collection of accidental forms, supplies a
structured and orienting framework. The rise of intellectual property
was part of the creation of a new and distinctive set of social relations
based on the commodity form and market exchange as a pervasive type
of human interaction that radically transformed all aspects of society.
I discuss three features that make intellectual property a particularly
fitting, as well as somewhat distinctive, object of study within the
organizing frame of the history of capitalism: the history of intellectual
property understood as the study of the process of commodification
applied to the unique subject matter of information; the structural role
played by intellectual property in the development of capitalism; and
intellectual property as an area where some of the naturalizing

2.

My focus here is on the U.S. with respect to both the historiographical
literature and the historical process of the rise of capitalism alluded to.

3.

See Fisher, supra note 1, § II. A. (discussing that the transformation of
the American economy contributed dramatically to the rise of intellectual
property).
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assumptions of a market society are prone to float to the surface and
occasionally be challenged.

I.

Origin History

Why write the history of intellectual property? A standard answer
given to this question is the dramatic rise in importance of this field in
recent decades. 4 In the modern “information society,” this answer
observes, informational resources of different kinds play an increasingly
central economic, social, and cultural role. The legal field that governs
the production and use of such resources, known as intellectual
property, has experienced a matching upsurge in its importance. And
as intellectual property rose to prominence as a socio-legal phenomenon,
scholars in various academic disciplines, including economics, philos–
ophy, and also history, have come to take greater interest in exploring
it by deploying their various outlooks and methodological tools.5 But
this is no answer to the question posed here, which inquires not after a
positive explanation for the rise of multidisciplinary interest in this
area, but a purpose. The question, in other words, is: what does one
seek to accomplish by researching, uncovering, and elaborating the
history of the various legal fields that came to be known as intellectual
property? And this leads to a second question that follows closely: given
such a purpose, what is the preferred method or approach for writing
this history?
Legal historians of intellectual property, especially those working in
American law schools, are subject to a constant gravitational force
applied to their work in the field. This force pulls toward scholarship
that is focused on origin, constancy, or both. Origin orientation frames
the purpose of history as discovering at some constitutive moment,
hidden far in the past, the true and authoritative meaning of various
present-day rules, concepts or practices within intellectual property
law. 6 Was there common law copyright under eighteenth-century
English common law?7 Did juries decide questions of patent validity in

4.

Id. § I.

5.

Id. § II.

6.

See, e.g., Patrick Cronin, The Historical Origins of the Conflict between
Copyright and the First Amendment, 35 Colum. J.L. & Arts 221, 221–
222 & n.3 (2012) (noting that “[m]ost of the literature addressing the
relationship between copyright law and the First Amendment approaches
the question from either a doctrinal or an originalist perspective”).

7.

See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American
Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29
Wayne L. Rev. 1119, 1134 (1983); Ronan Deazley, The Myth of
Copyright at Common Law, 62 Cambridge L.J. 106, 106 (2003) (arguing
that the “House of Lords in Donaldson explicitly denied the existence of
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England circa 1791? 8 What exactly did the framers of the U.S.
Constitution mean in 1789 by the specific text of the intellectual
property clause that empowers Congress to legislate in the areas of
patents and copyrights?9 And so on and so forth. There are two latent
views mingled together in such a frame. The first is epistemological. It
assumes that a historical explanation of something (a doctrine, an
institution, a concept) is achieved by uncovering its true form or
meaning at one particular moment, i.e. the moment of its origin. To
explain what an injunction is, one has to focus on how seventeenthcentury (or earlier) courts of equity understood and applied it. The
second is prescriptive. It assumes that the original meaning or function
of the thing enjoys authority, that it mandates how the thing should
be. These views are further cashed out in two tacit assumptions that
underlie origin inquiries in legal history. First it is assumed that the
authoritative meaning of the relevant intellectual property rule or
concept located in the deep past remained relatively constant. To be
sure, some change is allowed, but this is usually relegated to the limited
sphere of accommodating new technological, economic, or social
circumstance while maintaining the underlying principle. Unless one
could point at a sharp and direct change, usually in the form of explicit
legislative “intervention.” Second, it is assumed that this foundational
past meaning is binding in the present simply by virtue of its existence:
any common law copyright”); H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Copyright at
Common Law in 1774, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (2014).
8.

See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid?, 99
Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1677 (2013); Brief for H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui and
Sean Bottomley as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 14–19, Oil
States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365
(2017) (No. 16-712). This inquiry stems from the Supreme Court’s position
that the Seventh Amendment’s right of trial by jury “is the right which
existed under the English common law when the Amendment was adopted.”
Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). See also
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (analyz–
ing the question of a jury right in patent cases guided by the need “to
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791”).

9.

See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the
Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspec–
tive (2002) (analyzing contemporaneous debates regarding Article 1,
Section 8). See, e.g., Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to
Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 Neb.
L. Rev. 754, 773–76 (2001); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright
in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power
Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, 52 Emory L.J. 909, 929–31 (2003); Dotan Oliar, Making
Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a
Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 Geo. L.J. 1771,
1771 (2006).
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how courts should analyze the grant of injunctions in patent cases is
determined by what English courts of equity did in 1789,10 and whether
the Patent Office has power to engage in administrative review of
patent validity hinges on the eighteenth-century practices of the Privy
Council. 11 Within such a framework, history is the handmaid of a
particular version of legal reasoning: it’s role is to recover from the mists
of the past the true and constant meaning of the law which holds
authority over the present.
There are strong reasons for this pull toward history as a search for
true and authoritative origin. Law is a field built on authority, often
understood as content-independent reasons for applying a particular
rule or reaching a certain result. 12 In a common-law system this
authority is routinely identified with what the law or practice of courts
about the law had been for a long period of time.13 To be sure, the
common law is also associated with incremental change, growth and
adaptation. Nevertheless, the drive to portray legal decisions as based
on “discovering” what the law had been for a long period (if not forever
then since “time immemorial” or some other point sufficiently remote

10.

H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui & Sean Bottomley, The Traditional Burdens
for Final Injunctions in Patent Cases c.1789 and Some Modern
Implications, 71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 403, 410–11 (2020). See also H.
Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright
Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-At-Law Requirement, 81 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1197, 1210–13 (2008). This inquiry is motivated by the Supreme
Court’s holding that “the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the
jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the
original Judiciary Act, 1789 (1 Stat. 73).” Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo,
S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (quoting
Armistead M. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure 660 (1928)).

11.

See Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, supra note 8, at 33–37. See also H.
Tomás Gómez-Arostegui & Sean Bottomley, Privy Council and Scire
Facias 1700–1883: An Addendum to the Brief for H. Tomás GómezArostegui and Sean Bottomley as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party 4 (last updated Nov. 6, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3054989.

12.

H. L. A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in Essays
on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 243,
261 (1982); see also Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 Va.
L. Rev. 1931, 1935–40 (2008). But see P. Markwick, Independent of
Content, 9 Legal Theory 43, 44–48 (2003) (arguing that legal reasons
cannot be “content-independent”).

13.

See Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New
Introduction to Legal Reasoning 36 (2009) (observing in the context
of precedent that “[l]aw characteristically faces backward”).
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in the past to bestow authority) remains strong.14 Notwithstanding that
central parts of intellectual property law are statutory, this commonlaw-induced search for authority in the distant past exerts its influence
and indeed is often extended beyond the past practices of courts to
those of legislatures and even administrative bodies.
In the U.S., the power of common-law-colored pursuit of past
authority is greatly amplified by originalism. Originalism, in its narrow
sense, is an approach to interpreting the Constitution.15 It identifies the
meaning of the constitutional text with its understanding by its
drafters, ratifiers or a more inclusive group of people at the time it was
originally given force. 16 Originalism has held sway over American
constitutional thought for decades and has recently experienced a
resurgence in its power.17 The influence of the originalist impulse in the
U.S., however, goes well beyond the constitutional realm. Intellectual
property scholarship has its own domain of constitutional originalism
centered around the so-called Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution.18 Yet within this field the originalist impulse informs and
motivates a broader search for the true meaning of legal texts, concepts,
and practices to be found at some foundational point in the past, be it
the time of the ratification of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, the
legislation of an early statute, the assumed time of reception of English
common law in American jurisdictions, or even the time of a
foundational court decision. The overarching premise is that what law
means and how it should be applied now must be traced to its meaning
at that foundational past time.
14.

See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4
(2009) (noting that proponents of originalism still consider it to be
“dominant” and “inescapable”).

15.

The literature on originalism is vast. Some of the best comprehensive
treatments are Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989), Dennis J. Goldford, The
American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism (2005),
and Berman, supra note 14.

16.

There are many variants of originalism that differ from each other in
various dimensions. See Berman supra note 14, at 8–16. The most
common distinction is based on the source of the binding original meaning,
with the standard positions identified being framers’ intent, ratifiers’
understanding, and public meaning. See id. at 9–10. These positions could
be further broken down even with respect to this dimension.

17.

Thus, it is not uncommon to find assertions, at least from proponents, that
originalism is the leading approach to constitutional interpretation in the
U.S. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45
Loy. L. Rev. 611, 613 (1999) (claiming that “[o]riginalism is now the
prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation”).

18.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. For examples of originalist studies of the clause’s
meaning see supra note 9.
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The pull of these attitudes toward a true and singular past origin
are further fueled by the drive to mobilize history in order to obtain
immediate present results. At least within the field of intellectual
property, the general interest of the legal community in the otherwise
somewhat marginalized area of legal history surges in the opportune
moments when an argument from history seems well poised to support
this or that specific result in a particular high-stakes legal dispute of
the day. Who would have thought, for example, that obscured
eighteenth-century practices of the Privy Council in revoking letter
patents would be a topic of general interest?19 It would not, unless
momentarily thought to be of potential consequence for a legal struggle
over the constitutionality of a modern administrative procedure for
reviewing the validity of patents.20 Lawyers and judges often take the
same attitude, suddenly recalling that “a page of history is worth
volumes of logic”21 when the particular page from the past, cast in

19.

See Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual
Property 21–23, 21 n. 35 (June 2005) (S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School)
(on file with author).

20.

Oil States Energy Servs. LLC, v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1377 (2018).

21.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (quoting New York Trust Co.
v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). The point of the Eldred Court’s
quotation from Justice Holmes stands in considerable tension with another
famous quip by him: “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469
(1897). Indeed, assuming that a legal norm’s meaning at some past moment
should determine its present application is a distortion of Holmes’s views of
the relationship between law and history. Even the views of the earlier
Holmes, more sympathetic to the role of history in law, were colored by the
German historical school and were quite different from the notion that past
meaning must govern present outcomes. See generally Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., The Common Law (1881). By the time of writing The Path
of the Law, Holmes had become even more skeptical of history, assigning it
the role of “the first step toward an enlightened scepticism” and providing
his famous description of the relationship of law and history that sealed his
turn to purpose: “[w]hen you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain
and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what
is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either
to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.” Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., supra, at 469. For the changing views of Holmes on the role of
history in law see Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 127
(1991) (emphasizing the change in Holmes’s views of the role of history in
law). See also David M. Rabban, Law’s History: American Legal
Thought and the Transatlantic Turn to History 260–68 (2013)
(emphasizing the continuity between Holmes’s early and later views, both
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originalist terms, promises to support a present legal result at hand.
This mobilization of history as a strategy for achieving a checkmate in
concrete present legal disputes, especially in a legal environment
saturated by the notions of the past as authority-conferring and original
meaning, further orients legal history toward a search for true and
constant meaning as it existed at a foundational historical moment.
What is wrong with this search of true origin as a guiding frame for
the writing of legal history and the history of intellectual property in
particular? There is nothing wrong with uncovering an accurate as
possible picture of the law at a particular time. Any approach to legal
history can benefit from this knowledge and some legal historians of
intellectual property have engaged in painstaking and impressive
archival research for piecing together such a picture.22 To be of use,
however, such information has to be an element of a broader account:
an account that explains, or perhaps even helps prescribe, something.
The trouble arises when the search for true origin to determine present
legal analysis takes command as the overarching purpose of historical
scholarship. On the prescriptive side, I will simply express deep skep–
ticism about whether past practice or understanding can justify in any
way present results.23 Even if origin accounts could explain anything,
one should not conflate that with justification. Focusing here on the
explanatory ambitions of legal history: work produced under this
framework of simply locating true origins at one static moment relies
on a poor form of historical explanation. In fact, it yields no explanation
at all.
One danger is that the yearning for retrieving authoritative
meaning from the past may lead to flattening or even ignoring
disagreement, contestation, and ambiguity, all of which are to be found
in abundance in concrete historical moments. Thus, for example, midnineteenth-century Americans agreed that natural principles could not
be owned 24 and that patents cover more than an exact mechanical
of which subjected the role of historical analysis in law to purpose and policy
evaluation).
22.

See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The
Historical Protection of Patents under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev.
689, 689 (2007); Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 7, at 414–28; Christopher
Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 Yale L.J. 848, 848
(2016).

23.

In other words, my skepticism is about whether originalism or quasioriginalism are desirable methods of legal analysis. See generally Berman,
supra note 14 (arguing that the claims of originalism are too strong and
that original intent can be considered without being treated as having
absolute authority).

24.

See Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The Intellectual Origins of
American Intellectual Property, 1790–1909, at 261–65 (2016)
[hereinafter Bracha, Owning Ideas]. See also Adam Mossoff, O’Reilly
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design and protected the “principles of a machine.”25 Yet they fiercely
disagreed on a fundamental level on the coverage and scope of patent
ownership and engaged in decades-long debate over the ownership of
principles.26 Many lawyers and judges, however, turn to the past to find
clear answers and therefore it is not uncommon for them to produce
thin and sometimes distorted versions of legal history in support of a
present agenda.27 The good legal historian, even one working within the
origin framework, can resist this temptation. In fact, the best scholar–
ship in this vein often revisits previous monolithic accounts, by showing
that certain aspects of intellectual property law assumed to be well
settled and clear in particular historical moments were in fact heavily
contested, undecided or subject to much ambiguity.28
A far greater and harder to evade danger is that of emphasizing
stability, while downplaying or even ignoring change. This danger is
v. Morse and Claiming a “Principle” in Antebellum Era Patent Law, 71
Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 735, 744–46 (2020).
25.

Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.
Mass. 1813); see also Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 256–58
(describing how Justice “Story was at the forefront of redefining the terms
of the field” of intellectual property and “laid the foundation for a dramatic
expansion of the concept of invention”).

26.

See generally Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 261–73 (discussing
the debate over the patentability of principles).

27.

A good example is the argument made by some that the language in the
1909 Copyright Act that statutory damages “shall not be regarded as a
penalty” means that such damages must be compensatory and not punitive
and must be limited in accordance with this purpose. Copyright Act of 1909,
Pub. L. No. 60–349, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075. See, e.g., Opening Brief for the
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 54, Sony BMG Ent. v. Tenenbaum,
660 F. 3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10–1883, 10–1947, 10–2052), 2010 WL
5623176; Betselot A. Zeleke, Federal Judges Gone Wild: The Copyright Act
of 1976 and Technology, Rejecting the Independent Economic Value Test,
55 How. L.J. 247, 253 (2011); Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory
Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability: Balancing
Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. Copy. Soc’y U.S.A.
265, 293 (2009); Alan E. Garfield, Calibrating Copyright Statutory Damages
to Promote Speech, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2010). Some even argue
that this limitation extends to statutory damages under the 1976 Copyright
Act. See Opening Brief for the Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra,
at 60. However, as persuasively showed by Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, when
the relevant statutory language is understood in its proper historical context
it is very unlikely that its meaning was precluding a punitive element to
copyright’s statutory damages. See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What
History Teaches Us About US Copyright Law and Statutory Damages, 5
W.I.P.O. J. 76, 80–86 (2013).

28.

See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought
About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context,
92 Cornell L. Rev. 953, 959 (2007); Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 7.
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almost inescapable with origin history because it is imprinted in its
guiding principle. When one sets out to find original and constant
meaning then that is what one is likely to find. What drops out of the
picture is the myriad ways in which law, its meaning, and its social
effect change, sometimes even when formal legal doctrines appear
unaltered, and any causal explanation of this change. In other words,
what is lost is the explanatory force of historical accounts. And what
takes its place is a naturalization of one historical moment as a genuine
or necessary state of affairs. Two examples may be helpful in
demonstrating how suppressing change to find constancy may lead to
serious distortions.
The fair use doctrine privileges certain uses of copyrighted works
that otherwise would be infringing.29 It is considered today the main
and most important limitation on the scope of copyright.30 While all
acknowledge evolution and growth with respect to this doctrine, there
is also a widespread narrative of constancy in this area.31 In the U.S.,
the source of the doctrine is often traced to Justice Joseph Story’s 1841
seminal decision in Folsom v. Marsh.32 More informed versions point to
the earlier eighteenth century English cases from which the doctrine
evolved. 33 Either way, accounts of fair use are often laced with a
remarkable assumption of stability stretching over three centuries.
These accounts assume, as one commentator puts it, “substantial
continuity between fair abridgment in the premodern era and fair use
in the United States today.”34 This view is not without a grain of truth.
The early English cases, while permitting various secondary uses of
29.

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).

30.

See 4 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 10:1.50 (Thomson
Reuters ed., 2020) (observing that “[f]air use is an important safety valve
that acts as a bulwark against the monopoly power that inheres in an
exclusive right”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv.
L. Rev. 1105, 1107 (1990) (observing that fair use is “a rational, integral
part of copyright, whose observance is necessary to achieve the objectives
of that law”).

31.

See, e.g., Leval, supra note 30, at 1105 (referring to decisions that have
applied the fair use doctrine “for nearly 300 years”); Matthew Sag, The
Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 1371, 1393–1409 (2011);
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (observing
that “[f]rom the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair
use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copy–
right’s very purpose”); Threshold Media Corp. v. Relativity Media, LLC,
166 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“Fair use developed in
English courts during the eighteenth century as an equitable exception to
copyright protection.”).

32.

9 F. Cas. 342 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1841).

33.

See infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.

34.

Sag, supra note 31, at 1373.
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works that fell short of complete reproduction, typically abridgments,
also insisted that to avoid infringement, such uses must be “fair” or
“bona fide.”35 In examining this question, English courts resorted to
legal formulas and asked questions that appear very similar to those
used in modern fair use analysis.36 When Justice Story introduced the
doctrine to American law in Folsom he drew on those formulas37 and
those later became the fundamental elements of the modern fair use
doctrine, eventually codified in 1976.38
The trouble with the constancy narrative of fair use is that it
obscures the process of deep transformation undergone by copyright of
which the rise and development of the fair use doctrine in the U.S. was
an important part. 39 During the nineteenth century the scope of
copyright and, more importantly, the concept of copyright ownership
had changed fundamentally.40 In 1790 copyright still had its traditional
institutional form of a narrow publisher’s exclusive right to print and
sell a specific book.41 This underlying understanding was captured in
the doctrinal formula that limited infringement to “copies” of the
protected text including an additional penumbra of evasive reproduc–
tion with colorable changes.42 The focus on a restrictive notion of a copy
meant that the baseline was that secondary uses, such as abridgments
or translations, were allowed.43 The traditional fair abridgment analysis
pertained to the second element of evasive reproduction. Its guiding
35.

See, e.g., Burnett v. Chetwood (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008, 1009, 2 Mer. 441;
Gyles v. Wilcox (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490, 2 Atk. 141; Dodsley v.
Kinnersley (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271, Amb. 403; Wilkins v. Aikin (1810)
34 Eng. Rep. 163, 164, 17 Ves. Jun. 422.

36.

Sag, supra note 31, at 1393. Specifically, Sag identifies four “constants” of
fair use connecting the eighteenth-century cases to the modern doctrine:
case-by-case analysis, the amount taken, the effect of the use on the market
of the copyrighted work, and the extent to which the secondary use
constitutes a distinct and different work of authorship. Id. at 1393–1409.

37.

Id. at 1376–77; see also R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh:
Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses (Copyright), in
Intellectual Property Stories 259 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).

38.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).

39.

See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets,
and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 186, 229–
30 (2008) [hereinafter Bracha, Ideology of Authorship]; Bracha, Owning
Ideas, supra note 24, at 166–70.

40.

Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 166.

41.

See Bracha, Ideology of Authorship, supra note 39, at 225–26.

42.

Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206–07 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853); see also
Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 146–49.

43.

See Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 169–70.
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principle was focused on the question of direct substitution in the
primary market: one could not render the law’s prohibition on making
copies meaningless by reproduction with colorable change that would
directly compete with the protected work.44 By the beginning of the
twentieth century a thoroughly different concept was on the rise, one
under which copyright came to be seen as a broad right to extract value
from all possible markets for an intellectual work which could take
many concrete expressive forms. 45 Legal doctrine expressed this
underlying concept: copyright now extended to any substantially
similar reproduction of the work, including in various secondary
markets, completely distinct from the work’s primary one.46 This broad
right was restricted only by certain doctrinal safety-valves, of which the
newly-shaped fair use analysis was a part.47 The importation of fair use
in the 1841 Folsom decision was an early stage of this process of
abstraction and expansion. Through the craft of common law analysis
Justice Story and later courts were pouring new wine into the
eighteenth-century doctrinal bottles, even as they were studiously citing
the same textual formulas.48
Emerging nineteenth-century fair use jurisprudence, in other words,
was a vehicle for undermining the older framework of copyright
embodied in the eighteenth-century fair abridgment cases. 49 When,
44.

See id. at 150–51.

45.

See id. at 175–87.

46.

See, e.g., Maxwell v. Goodwin, 93 F. 665, 666–67 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1899)
(finding jury instruction correct in requiring substantial and material
copying for a finding of piracy); Gilmore v. Anderson, 38 F. 846, 849
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889) (holding no defense exists for copyright infringement
that second work is written for different markets); Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas.
1132, 1137–38 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (same). See also Eaton S. Drone, A
Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in
Great Britain and the United States 385 (1879) (“The controlling
question always is, whether the substance of the work is taken without
authority.”).

47.

Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 165. The other safety valves
alongside fair use were the requirement of substantial similarity and the
idea expression dichotomy. Id. at 165–71, 174–75. In its early period as a
safety valve mechanism, the fair use inquiry remained part of the copyright
infringement test. Id. at 165–66. The formal legal understanding of fair use
as an external restrictive principle and then as a defense, developed later in
a process that extended well into the twentieth century. See Reese, supra
note 37, at 288–90; L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5
J. Intell. Prop. L. 431, 448–49, 452 (1998).

48.

See Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 166.

49.

See Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 169–70; see also
Patterson, supra note 47, at 431–32; John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use?
The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 465, 480
(2005).
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however, the focus is on constancy, on the proposition that fair use is
“as old as copyright itself,”50 both the fundamental change of American
copyright and the role played in it by the evolution and transformation
of fair use disappear from sight. We are left with an empty dry pod of
the remarkable similarity of form between the premodern and modern
doctrinal formulas of fair use and miss altogether its substantive
content: the actual radical transformation of American copyright.
Consider a second example. It used to be common to assert that
the U.S. Patent system launched with the Patent Act of 179051 was an
examination system. 52 Such assertions are occasionally still made in
passing in more modern scholarship.53 To be sure, many of those who
describe the early patent regime as an examination system understand
that its humble beginnings were very different from the extensive
administrative framework of modern examination.54 Nevertheless, the
50.

Lauren Gorab, A Fair Use to Remember: Restoring Application of the
Fair Use Doctrine to Strengthen Copyright Law and Disarm Abusive
Copyright Litigation, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 703, 709 n.49 (2018).

51.

Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790)
[hereinafter 1790 Patent Act].

52.

See, e.g., M. F. Bailey, History of Classification of Patents, 28 J. Pat. Off.
Soc’y 463, 465 (1946) (“When the act of April 10, 1790, authorized the
grant of patents upon satisfactory evidence of novelty, utility, and invention,
the examination system of patent grants was independently launched into
the body of existing laws.”); Frank D. Prager, Examination of Inventions
from the Middle Ages to 1836, 46 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 268, 289 (1964)
(observing that the 1790 patent regime created “an examination practice
similar to that of France.”); H. Marans, In the Beginning, 39 J. Pat. Off.
Soc’y 147, 148 (1957); Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard
of Patentability, 48 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 5, 26–27 (1966); John T. Roberts,
A Reappraisal of the American System of Patent Examining, 48 J. Pat.
Off. Soc’y 156, 161 (1966).

53.

See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice &
Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790-1865, 19
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 143, 149 (2011) (the 1790 Patent Act created “an
examination system”); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress
of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part
I), 79 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 61, 63 (1997); George E.
Hutchinson & Herbert H. Mintz, William Thornton, Founder of Washington,
D.C., Architect of the United States Capitol Building, and Superintendent of
the Early United States Patent Office, 5 J. Fed. Cir. Hist. Soc’y 45, 56
(2011); Megan M. La Belle, Public Enforcement of Patent Law, 96 B.U. L.
Rev. 1865, 1881 (2016). To be fair, these more modern writers who make
such references typically do not engage in a deep inquiry with respect to the
character of the early patent system and whether it was one of rights or
privileges. Nevertheless, such casual references tend to perpetuate the
assumption that the early patent system was based on examination in the
modern sense.

54.

See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 53, at 1867–69 (describing the many layers
of the current patent system).
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resultant picture is that of continuity, only now with an unavoidable
lapse: in 1790 the U.S. launched an examination patent system,
rudimentary though it might have been, then in 1793 it switched to a
registration system,55 and finally in 183656 it went back to a more fully
developed examination scheme.57 A direct straight line connects 1790 to
1836 to the modern patent system, despite the fact that, in what one
commentator describes as a “strange” development,58 it fades away for
a period of 43 years.
What is lost in this narrative is again the deep institutional and
ideological transformation of patents not just between 1790 and 1836
but also beyond. In this case the relevant dimension is the
transformation of privileges into rights. Calling the 1790 regime an
examination system is a classic example of an anachronistic transplan–
tation of the present in the past. To be sure, the 1790 Act created a
three-person “Patent Board” and charged it with ascertaining that an
invention or discovery is “sufficiently useful and important” as a
precondition for lawfully exercising the power of granting a patent.59
This, however, was part of a scheme characteristic of the English patent
tradition since the 1624 Statute of Monopolies60 and the seventeenthcentury common law on the subject. 61 Premodern patents were
privileges. They were overtly political acts of the crown that conferred
discretionary monopolies on specifically chosen individuals under the
official justification of promoting the public weal.62 The concept of a
patent “right” was foreign to this practice. The seventeenth-century
struggle over the royal prerogative restricted the royal power. The
55.

Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).

56.

Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 357, sec. 7, 5 Stat. 117
(1836).

57.

See, e.g., Prager, supra note 52, at 289 (observing that in some respects the
1836 regime “returned to principles of 1790”); Michael Risch, America’s
First Patents, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1279, 1282 (2012) (contrasting the 1793–
1836 registration period with “two periods of examination” in 1790–1793 and
post-1836); Morriss & Nard, supra note 53, at 144 (observing that American
patent law “switch[ed] from an examination system to a registration system
and back”).

58.

Prager, supra note 52, at 289.

59.

1790 Patent Act, supra note 51, at sec. 1.

60.

Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 (Eng.) [hereinafter Statute of
Monopolies].

61.

See Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents
Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 177, 191,
194–200 (2004) [hereinafter Bracha, Commodification] (explaining the
structure of early English patents as privileges under the common law and
the Statute of Monopolies).

62.

See id. at 198.
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resultant legal framework allowed royal monopoly grants only in
exceptional cases, designated patents for inventions as one of those
exceptions and limited even such patent grants, most importantly
through the requirement of novelty and a fourteen-year time cap.63 The
new legal framework created, however, neither patent rights nor a
standardized set of entitlements granted under a patent. 64 The
American colonies and later the states developed their own local
variants of this patent privilege institution with ad hoc legislative
grants taking the place of the royal prerogative.65 Thus, it comes as no
surprise, that in 1790 Americans who were steeped in these traditions
created a republican version of the familiar royal privilege scheme.66
The formal institutional features of the regime were firmly rooted in
premodern patent privileges rather than modern patent rights. Unlike
the modern Patent Office, the three high-ranking officials (Secretary of
State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General) who formed the Patent
Board were not directed to “examine” whether a petitioner satisfied a
standard set of conditions that would then require the issuance of a
patent as a matter of right.67 The Board, just like the crown, had a
discretionary power to grant a patent privilege when according to its
judgment that served the public good, subject to various restrictions
and requirements.68
As Kara Swanson shows in this volume, actual practice during the
short period in which the 1790 regime existed was characterized by deep
ambiguity.69 While the formal regime was firmly rooted in the privilege
tradition, the actual grant practices moved considerably toward a rights
framework: the Board’s work seems to have been focused on
ascertaining the patentability requirements rather than assessing the
social contribution of inventions and the trend was toward standard–

63.

See Statute of Monopolies, supra note 60; see also Bracha, Commodification,
supra note 61, at 197 (describing the Statute of Monopolies exception from
its ban on monopolies for invention patents).

64.

See Bracha, Commodification, supra note 61, at 192.

65.

See id., at 211–16; Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez
Faire, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 45, 58–60 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 263,
279, 282–83 (2016).

66.

See 1790 Patent Act, supra note 51; Bracha, Commodification, supra note
61, at 222 (concluding that under the 1790 Patent Act, “the grant [of a
patent] remained a matter of privilege . . . no enforceable individual right
for a patent existed”).

67.

See Bracha, Commodification, supra note 61, at 220.

68.

See id. at 220–27.

69.

See Kara Swanson, Making Patents: Patent Administration, 1790–1860,
71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 784–85 (2020).

561

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
The History of Intellectual Property as The History of Capitalism

ization. 70 There were strong forces, both practical and ideological,
pulling in this direction. The point here, however, is exactly that a
narrative under which the 1790 regime was an examination system
hides this dynamic and its importance from view: the process in which
a premodern regime planted in a changing ideological and practical
climate was subject to pressures and gradually began to change its
orientation from privilege into right from the ground up.
The same applies to the registration period. When one no longer
projects an examination framework—meaning a system of precertification of standard eligibility requirements for a patent right—
onto the 1790 regime, the switch to a registration system no longer
appears “strange.” Issuance of patents upon satisfaction of the formal
petition requirements and deferral of all substantive matters to ex-post
institutional treatment71 was the other readily available alternative at
the time. In fact, this practice was reflective of the de facto situation in
England during this period, where the privilege system degenerated to
a practice of issuance on demand in most cases, but was not replaced
by a patent rights scheme.72 During the registration period in the U.S.,
the same process that started under the 1790 regime continued to
unfold: a constant struggle between a privilege and a right
understanding of patents and the gradual decline of the former. In this
period, since, in the words of Jefferson, the U.S. following England “had
given it to her judges,” this process continued predominantly, but not
exclusively, in the courts.73
The 1836 Patent Act 74 that launched the early form of modern
examination and the administrative system to exercise it, was rooted
70.

Id.; Bracha, Commodification, supra note 61, at 226.

71.

In England this was the situation de facto since the late seventeenth
century: patents were issued there largely on demand upon satisfaction of
the relevant procedures and review happened ex post through revocation
proceedings and validity challenges. See, e.g., Christine MacLeod,
Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System
1660-1800, 46–47 (1988); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of
the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 4), 78 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc’y 77, 88 (1996). During this period the relative
importance of the institutions in charge of ex post review changed with the
role of the courts rising and that of the Privy Council declining. See, e.g.,
E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for
Invention from the Restoration to 1794 II, 33 L.Q. Rev. 180, 181 (1917);
Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, supra note 11 (discussing the Privy
Council’s role circa 1791).

72.

See MacLeod, supra note 71, at 47.

73.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 336–37 (Andrew A. Lipscomb,
ed., 1903).

74.

Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
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not only in the internal ills of the registration system75 but in a new
ideological environment. The 1836 Act was a product of a Jacksonian
attack on special privileges and a demand for their replacement by
standardized rights formally open to all.76 The parallel between the new
patent system and the Jacksonian shift from ad hoc corporate charters
to general incorporation speaks volumes about the common ideological
origins of the two as well as the intensity of the ferment and the depth
of the change that took place at this time.77 Thus the new 1836 regime
was a more decisive move to a patent right framework. Even in the
wake of this new regime, however, the struggle continued on a
secondary level. 78 It would take decades more for the remnants of
patents as privileges to be completely stomped out.79 In short, once the
distorting lens of continuity between 1790 and 1836 is removed, a
central feature of the transition from premodern to modern patents that
was previously obscured can come into sharp view, namely: the shift
from privileges to rights.
The point of these two examples is not to reveal anything new to
legal historians. Any serious student of the history of intellectual
property is aware of the deep changes alluded to above with respect to
the basic framework of the copyright and patent regimes. The point is
that writing origin history about other aspects of intellectual property
is likely to create the same distortions that are painfully apparent in
these two examples. When the historian embarks on the lawyer’s errand
of finding the authoritative, constant meaning of the law at a distant
point in time, the outcome will almost inevitably be a restrictive focus
on that singular point in time, a narrow emphasis on a single rule or
concept rather than broader understanding of its meaning within the
system of which it was a part, and disregard for change and develop–
ment. This is as true of the specific topics with which intellectual
property historians are engaged with today as it is of the obvious
examples of fair use and examination.
The history of intellectual property, however, was one of
fundamental and deep change rather than constancy, especially in its
formative era during the nineteenth century. There is a reason for that.
The development of modern intellectual property was one facet of “the

75.

See Report From the Hon. Henry Ellsworth to the Secretary of State, and
transmitted to the Select Committee on the Patent Laws, reproduced in
1 J. Am. Inst. 577, 578–81 (1836).

76.

See Bracha, Commodification, supra note 61, at 236.

77.

Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 210.

78.

Id. at 215.

79.

Id. at 215–16.
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great transformation:” the rise of modern capitalism.80 At its infancy
the U.S. was, largely, a pre-capitalist society.81 By the same token, late
eighteenth-century intellectual property still consisted of institutional
forms and legal concepts forged in a pre-capitalist era of guild regulation
and state patronage as imported from England and adapted in the
colonial context. To be sure, in various ways intellectual property was
starting to emerge beyond those traditional forms, but that change was
just beginning. Once this is kept firmly in mind, it becomes apparent
how strange it is to look for the timeless, authoritative meaning of the
law at an early moment of pre-capitalist times and write static history
that is focused in a single-minded way on such a point in time. In the
remainder of this essay, I discuss what it might mean to write the
history of intellectual property as part of the history of the fundamental
transformation in which the emergence of this field was embedded: the
rise of capitalism.

II. New History of Capitalism
Is there an alternative to writing the history of intellectual property
in search of stable past meaning to resolve contemporary questions?
One can find a variety of approaches and perspective within what has
become a rich body of work in this area. Some scholars apply the lens
of “cliometric” economic history, applying economic theory to episodes
from the history of intellectual property to both explain these episodes
and test the theory. 82 Others write contextual, intellectual history,
elaborating the development of central concepts in the field by reference
to more general intellectual trends in society. 83 Still others treat
80.

Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and
Economic Origins of Our Time, at xix, 47 (Beacon Press 2001) (1944).

81.

See James A. Henretta, The Origins of American Capitalism: Collected
Essays, at xxi (1991) (observing that “there was a transition to capitalism
during the generation following the American Revolution”).

82.

B. Zorina Khan, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and
Copyrights in American Economic Development, 1790–1920, at 18
(2005); see, e.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Dhanoos
Sutthiphisal, Patent Alchemy: The Market for Technology in U.S. History,
87 Bus. Hist. Rev. 3 (2013); Petra Mosser, Pirates and Patents:
An Economic History of Intellectual Property and Innovation
(forthcoming).

83.

See generally, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:
An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255 (2001)
(discussing the trend of patent from royal privilege to common-law property
right); Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American
Intellectual Property Law, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 139 (2008) (discussing
an attitude shift towards competition during the New Deal period); Robert
Brauneis, The Transformation of Originality in the Progressive-Era Debate
over Copyright in News, 27 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 321 (2009)
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intellectual property history as social history by focusing on the
development of related social and institutional practices such as the
emergence of professional fields or the actual practice of lower courts,
sometimes taking a quantitative approach.84 Meanwhile, critical history
tries to uncover and historicize entrenched, taken for granted,
ideological assumptions constitutive of the field.85 I would like to focus
here, not so much on an alternative to these various approaches, but
on an overarching organizing frame within which each of those
approaches and others can be pursued. This frame is writing the history
of intellectual property as part of the history of capitalism.
Perhaps the most important recent development in American
historiography is the rise of the “new history of capitalism.”86 The label
is applied to the growing body of work done in the wake of resurgence
of interest in the history of the economy. While economic history never
disappeared from history departments, for a long period beginning in
the 1970s interest in it dwindled.87 Economic history largely migrated

(discussing the change in conceptions of originality in copyright law);
Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making
of American Copyright Law, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 319 (2017) (discussing
the revisionist account of a 1903 Supreme Court case and its decisive and
damaging influence on modern copyright law).
84.

See generally, e.g., Kara W. Swanson, The Emergence of the Professional
Patent Practitioner, 50 Tech. & Culture 519 (2009) (discussing the
emergence of patent practice as a new occupation and field); Beauchamp,
supra note 22 (discussing the “first patent litigation explosion” by drawing
on data from two federal courts from 1840 to 1910); Will Slauter, Who
Owns the News?: A History of Copyright (2019) (discussing the
evolving attitudes toward viewing news as intellectual property).

85.

See generally, e.g., Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:
Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author,’ 17
Eighteenth-Century Stud. 425 (1984) (discussing the development of
the meaning of “author”); Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The
Invention of Copyright (1993) (discussing the change of relationship
between authorship and ownership); Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently,
The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British
Experience, 1760–1911 (1999) (discussing the gradual development of
intellectual property law in Britain); Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note
24 (discussing the American development of the concept of Intellectual
property); Alain Pottage & Brad Sherman, Figures of Invention:
A History of Modern Patent Law (2010) (retracing the emergence
of the conception of the invention in modern patent law).

86.

Introduction, in American Capitalism: New Histories 4–5 (Sven
Beckert & Christine Desan eds., 2018).

87.

Sven Beckert, History of American Capitalism, in American History
Now 316–17 (Eric Foner & Lisa McGirr eds., 2011).

565

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
The History of Intellectual Property as The History of Capitalism

to economic departments,88 while business and labor historians found
themselves in increasingly narrow, cabined subfields as the core interest
of historians shifted toward social and then cultural history. 89 This
trend has gradually changed, however, in the last two decades.90 The
reversal was spurred by both external developments—such as waves of
economic upheavals experienced on a global scale, concerns about
rampant inequality or sustainability, 91 and the realization that
declaring “the end of history” with respect to political and economic
organization may have been premature92—and ones more internal to
the history discipline. 93 The result is a renewed broad interest in
studying the history of the economy with an emphasis on the origins
and development of the unique system of capitalism and a rapidly
growing body of work in this vein.94 This trend is too new and the
commitments, assumptions and methodologies of scholars working
within it are probably too diverse to refer to it as a “school.” One may
identify, however, certain general characteristics that are loosely shared
by the work comprising this new wave of the historical study of
capitalism.
The first and most obvious feature of the new histories of capitalism
is the fundamental one already mentioned: a renewed focus on the
economy as a central object of historical study and a major explanatory
force.95 Underlying this trend is a growing sense that capitalism is “too
important and complex a subject to be left to economists.” 96 Put
88.

Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21
L. & Hist. Rev. 297, 301 (2003); American Capitalism, supra note 86,
at 7; Beckert supra note 87, at 316.

89.

American Capitalism, supra note 86, at 7–8; Beckert, supra note 87, at
316–17.

90.

American Capitalism, supra note 86, at 1.

91.

Id. at 2; Beckert, supra note 87, at 315.

92.

Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, at xi
(1992). For Fukuyama’s declaration being premature, see American
Capitalism, supra note 86, at 2.

93.

American Capitalism, supra note 86, at 1–2.

94.

Id.

95.

Jefferey Sklansky, The Elusive Sovereign: New Intellectual and Social
Histories of Capitalism, 9 Mod. Intell. Hist. 233, 234 (2012) (observing
that “capitalism has reemerged at the center of a rising generation of
scholarship”).

96.

Richard F. Teichgraeber III, Capitalism and Intellectual History, 1 Mod.
Intell. Hist. 267, 268 (2004) (quoting Jerry Z. Muller, The Mind and
the Market: Capitalism in Modern European Thought, at ix (2002)).
At the same time, one could argue that the subject is also too important and
complex to ignore economists altogether. See generally Eric Hilt, Economic
History, Historical Analysis, and the “New History of Capitalism,” 77 J.
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differently, the core insight here is that the economic sphere is central
for understanding human society and its development, and that it exists
in symbiosis with and sends its tentacles into all other social spheres.97
This focus on the economy and its centrality is accompanied by
foregrounding the fact that the modern era is marked by the rise of a
new mode of organizing economic life that embodies social relations
radically different in their structure and dynamics compared to any–
thing else in human history.98 The assumption here is that capitalism
has its own distinctive “logic” or set of dynamics, that within human
history are new and transformative. This double focus on economic life
and on uncovering the structure of capitalism as a radically new and
distinct system is what gives the new trend both its central orientation
and title.
A second feature, following closely on the heels of the previous one,
is an emphasis on denaturalizing the market.99 The commitment here is
to push against a strong tendency generated by immersion in the
practices of a market society to project these practices as natural,
universal, or inevitable for any human society, a tendency that is
reflected in scholarship. Perhaps the most famous version is Adam
Smith’s stipulation of “a certain propensity in human nature . . . to
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.”100 Such assumptions
about human nature usually lead to two versions of the inevitability of
the market society: either it is assumed to always having been there
from the dawn of human society or it is seen as the outcome of a
necessary and linear economic and social development toward more
Econ. Hist. 511 (2017) (arguing in support of a collaboration between the
fields of economic history and history of capitalism).
97.

See Michael Zakim & Gary J. Kornblith, Introduction: An American
Revolutionary Tradition, in Capitalism Takes Command: The Social
Transformation of Nineteenth-Century America 1–2 (Michael
Zakim & Gary J. Kornblith eds., 2012) (observing that capitalism “reached
far beyond the purview of capital, and even of the economy”). Beckert,
supra note 87, at 319 (arguing that “historians of capitalism see the
‘economy’ as a category that cannot be isolated analytically or historically
from the rest of American history”). Note that nothing in this realization
requires accepting an orthodox Marxist distinction between an economic
“base” that determines all other surface phenomena in society’s “super–
structure.”

98.

See Zakim & Kornblith, supra note 97, at 4 (arguing that “only in the
nineteenth century did these societies with markets became market
societies”).

99.

See Beckert, supra note 87, at 319–21 (discussing the new historians of
American capitalist adopting denaturalizing approaches that emphasize
the social, economic, and political influences).

100. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations 16 (1776).
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complex forms of market exchange.101 New history of capitalism scholars
start with the opposite premise that “there was nothing natural,
preordained, or predictable”102 in the rise of the market-based society.
Indeed, some of them see the naturalization of the market, most
prominently by neoclassical economics, as the source of the impulse by
historians to reclaim the study of the economy. 103 Such historians
denaturalize the market by historicizing it. By closely chronicling the
emergence of the specific social relations of capitalism they show that
these relations neither “came in the first ships”104 nor were the outcome
of an inevitable, linear development.
The focus on capitalism as a distinct economic system of recent
vintage leads directly to a third common feature: an emphasis on the
close historical study of what might be termed the “technologies” of
capitalism.105 Capitalism arose through the development of various new
practices that together created a new social order. Debt and mortgages,
the world of finance, incorporation, risk management, accounting and
filing practices, to name just a few.106 These constituted the bones and
muscles of a new form of market society. The new history of capitalism
is engaged in the cataloging and close study of these practices, the
process of conflict, struggle, and adaptation from which they emerged
and their consolidation into what we know today as “the market.”107
Fourth, the new history of capitalism emphasizes the role of the
state in constituting economic life.108 This emphasis is a counterreaction
to classical liberalism’s representation of the economy as a sphere of the
spontaneous private action of individuals free from state “intervention”
unless such intervention is imposed by “external” governmental

101. See American Capitalism, supra note 86, at 6.
102. Zakim & Kornblith, supra note 97, at 7.
103. See American Capitalism, supra note 86, at 6; see also Beckert, supra
note 87, at 315–16.
104. Carl N. Degler, Out of Our Past: The Forces that Shaped
Modern America 2 (1959).
105. See Zakim & Kornblith, supra note 97, at 7.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 7 (aiming to offer an “inventory of means by which capitalism
took command of society”); Sklansky, supra note 95, at 238 (describing
how historians examine the “foundational role” of the emergence of
various financial methods and institutions).
108. See Beckert, supra note 87, at 322; Sklansky, supra note 95, at 247; Stefan
Link & Noam Maggor, The United States As A Developing Nation:
Revisiting The Peculiarities Of American History, 246 Past & Present
269, 298 (2020) (referring to “the deconstruction of received dichotomies
between state policy and market development”).
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regulation.109 Historians writing in this vein are committed to, some–
times even obsessed with, showing that governmental action, rather
than non-existent or being an external intervention, is a precondition
for a capitalist market. 110 Government, they stress, creates and
maintains the very institutions—such as property and contractual
rights, a medium of exchange, financial and credit arrangements—that
are the very fabric and lifeblood of the market. 111 One historian
comments, with awe that cannot but seem amusing from the
perspective of an American law school, that: “Even property rights, the
quintessential foundational category of capitalism . . . are conventions
formed by rules that are often articulated by the law, and thus the
state.”112 Two sources of inspiration lead in this direction. One is the
school of American political development in political science113 and the
more general trend of “bringing the state back” in social sciences.114 The
other comes from American legal history’s immersion in the legal realist
attack on the public/private distinction and its insistence that the
supposedly private sphere is constituted through and through by
governmental action in the form of law.115 Together the two converge
on one message: governmental action through law constitutes markets
and therefore the latter cannot be studied or understood without the
former.
Fifth, a stress on governmental action as constitutive of markets
leads directly to a focus on the political sphere.116 If governmental action
constitutes the market then who controls governmental action in what
way becomes an essential element of economic history. The insistence
here is on politicizing the economy by showing that the institutions
109. Link & Maggor, supra note 108, at 5.
110. See Ajay K. Mehrotra, A Bridge Between: Law and the New Intellectual
Histories of Capitalism, 64 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2016).
111. See id. at 14–15.
112. Beckert, supra note 87, at 319.
113. See id. at 322.
114. See generally Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of
Analysis in Current Research, in Bringing the State Back (Peter B.
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol eds., 1985) (discussing
the return of “the state” into the discourse of social scientists).
115. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly NonCoercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 474–75 (1923); Morris R. Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L. Q. 8, 12 (1927); John P.
Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev.
253, 254 (1947).
116. See Mehrotra, supra note 110, at 10; Link & Maggor, supra note 108, at
300 (referring to putting “politics and contestation squarely at the centre”
of the analysis of capitalist development).
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that constitute the market emerged not through a process of internal
organic growth, but rather through the power struggles, strategies,
compromises, and vagaries of the political process.117 Hence, telling the
story of the rise of capitalism requires devoting as much attention to
politics as to economic institutions as well as an insistence on the
inseparable connection between the two.118
There is much that is promising in the approach of the new history
of capitalism as a framework for exploring the history of intellectual
property. Before turning to that, however, some of the potential pitfalls
of this approach must be highlighted in order to be avoided. The chief
danger lies in the way that many historians working within this frame
have understood the two last features of the role of the state and of
politicizing the economy, and the way that this understanding can cause
the core motivation of studying modern capitalism to unravel.
Starting with the emphasis on the role of government and law in
constituting the market, these themes certainly have their proper role.
A healthy reminder of the implausibility of a nineteenth-century version
of liberalism in which the economy is conceptualized as a sphere of
spontaneous private activity untouched by government involvement
unless artificially imposed is useful.119 More importantly, no account of
capitalist institutions can be complete without an understanding of
government’s role in underwriting and maintaining these institutions,
which applies to anything from currency to credit systems. By the same
token, it is important to give law its due attention as the “substance”
from which these institutions are actually made: market exchange,
finance or debt (for example) are all constituted by law and operate
through complex legal plumbing. 120 Understanding those institutions
requires explaining their internal mechanics.121 The trouble begins when
proper attention to the role of government and law becomes an
117. See American Capitalism: New Histories, supra note 86, at 5
(referring to “markets as politically engineered”).
118. See Beckert, supra note 87, at 319 (arguing that “states and markets,
politics and business, cannot be understood separately from one another”
and observing that “the rules of exchange are set politically” and are
“influenced by the shifting power relations of various social groups”).
119. Whether this assumption is pervasive today is a different question.
Arguably neoliberalism is different from classical liberalism exactly by
accepting the basic insight of state-created institutions as constituting the
market and then proceeding to effortlessly assume that a particular set of
market institutions are clearly preferable.
120. See David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 Harv. L. Rev.
626, 658 (2014) (reviewing Thomas Piketty, Capital in the TwentyFirst Century (2014)).
121. Id. at 659 (calling upon scholars to “consider the way that law structures
not just the particular bargains in capitalism . . . but also the broader
social and political setting of the market”).
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overemphasis. At the end, capitalism is a set of social relations between
people. A sole focus on what government does or does not do may
distract from what should be the core question: what kind of social
relations does capitalism institute? Things get worse when a sole focus
on what the state does transforms into the proposition that capitalism
is whatever the state does. At this point the initial motivating purpose
of the inquiry may be lost altogether. To see how, consider the role of
politics in the analysis.
As with the role of the state, politics deserves its proper attention
in the study of both how capitalism came about and how it operates.
The trouble begins once the guiding principle shifts from understanding
the role of politics in the rise and operation of capitalism to the notion
that capitalism is whatever hodgepodge set of institutional details that
the power struggles of various interests happened to produce at a given
moment. The fast transition here is from understanding markets as
“politically constituted” to guiding one’s inquiry with the proposition
that “the market” is not “a discrete phenomenon.”122 Capitalism, in
other words, loses any distinctive content or logic that could be
analytically tracked since “markets are malleable and come in many
forms because of variations in legal institutionalization” which are
themselves the outcome of politics.123 And from there are “no general
laws of capitalism” the way is very short to “there is no such thing as
capitalism.”124
This unfortunate orientation runs backward to infect each of the
features discussed above until it causes the basic driving force of
historically explaining capitalism to unravel. If the market is any
random set of arrangements generated by politics, then it is everything
and anything the state or the law do about the market in a particular
historical moment. The “technologies” of capitalism are, in turn, simply
a haphazard laundry list, rather than a structured set of relations with
a distinctive logic. Denaturalization, instead of rejection of the notion
that capitalism is grounded in human nature or some timeless, universal
feature of human society, becomes contingency, meaning simply the
assertion that markets are “indeterminate” and can consist of any set
of institutional arrangements. And at the final stage, an overemphasis
of the—in itself correct—theme of law as constituting the market
through politics ends up consuming the object of study and the core
motivation of explaining the distinctive structure and dynamics of
capitalism. If there is no such thing as capitalism, then what logic and
dynamics is there to explain? And how can such an account explain
anything? From this perspective capitalism is transformed into an
122. American Capitalism: New Histories, supra note 86, at 10.
123. Samuel Moyn, Thomas Piketty and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 128
Harv. L. Rev. F. 49, 53 (2014).
124. Id. at 55.
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overcrowded warehouse (or many of them) where an endless multitude
of dusty artifacts are piled in disarray. The history of capitalism, in
turn, becomes a lengthy inventory of those artifacts with its only
explanatory aspect being a chronicle of the struggles of those who
dumped the artifacts there.
The way to avoid this disintegration is to resist the contingency
urge that reduces capitalism into an endless collection of random and
shifting institutional details. This does not entail the other extreme of
insisting on the existence of universal “laws of capitalism”125 understood
as a uniform and stable form of social organization. The point is that
to be explained, capitalism should be understood as a set of relations
involving a distinctive structure (rather than anything goes) which at
the same time is generative and dynamic, meaning capable of
developing over time and assuming different variations in different
places or moments.

III. Intellectual Property Within a History of
Capitalism Framework
I have argued that to achieve fruitful historical analysis capable of
generating explanatory knowledge two extremes should be avoided.
One, of which origin history is a pristine example, is reification.
Reification is the reduction of dynamic human relations into a
monolithic and static object. 126 Origin history reifies by reducing
dynamic legal relations into an unchanged essence that is supposedly
revealed in the past. The second extreme is disintegration. A common
understanding of the history of capitalism threatens to turn into disin–
tegration by focusing on contingency that reduces the object of study
to a random collection of accidental and malleable features. Neither
reifying origin history nor contingency disintegration can supply a
historical explanation. The former is focused on uncovering a uniform
and stable object unchanged through time and thereby disables the very
heart of historical explanation which is about change and development.
The latter with its indeterminacy orientation allows only surface
description, rather than explanation. The goal should be avoiding both
of these extremes.
125. Id. (arguing that “those interested in bringing legal analysis to the moral
and analytical problem of inequality . . . might be most interested in a
style of analysis that broke with” the premise of general laws of capitalism
to be discovered).
126. See Douglas Litowitz, Reification in Law and Legal Theory, 9 S. Cal.
Interdisc. L.J. 401, 401 (2000). See generally 2 Georg Lukács, Reification
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, in History and Class
Consciousness 83 (Rodney Livingstone trans., 1971) (1968).
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What would the historical study of intellectual property as part of
the history of capitalism that avoids these two dangers look like? How
can one study intellectual property in a way that allows for develop–
ment through time as well as variation in a given period but without a
strong indeterminacy orientation that makes any explanation disappear
as so much sand in one’s hand?
As a starting point for such an undertaking, one needs an
underlying conception of capitalism.127 Here it is possible to offer only
an extremely bare-bones version of such a conception, but one that may
provide, nonetheless, some orientation in understanding what is meant
by the “logic” of capitalism within which the history of intellectual
property should be located. 128 Capitalism is an ensemble of social
relations. Indeed, it is the distinctive social relation of modernity.
Within human history, it is a new and distinctive system of social
relations that first appeared under the unique circumstances of
seventeenth-century England and spread and developed from there.129
The basic constitutive unit within this system is the commodity form:
the treatment of all human goods as subject to market exchange and
therefore stripped from all their unique qualities and reducible to an
assumed abstract and commensurable measure of value.130 At the heart
of the rise of capitalism was a process of commodification: the subjec–
tion of a growing array of goods to the commodity form through the
practice of market exchange. It was also a process of a rise of markets
in which markets became increasingly more generalized and disembedded.131 As markets became generalized, people increasingly had
to resort to market exchange to sell what they produce and obtain
127. Offering such a conception of capitalism to orient its study is, to some
extent, swimming against the current. There is a strong trend of assuming
that conceptualizing capitalism is impossible or purposefully avoiding it
in the name of scholarly pluralism. See, e.g., Interchange: The History of
Capitalism, 101 J. Am. Hist. 503, 509 (2014) (observing that “no one
[today] is clear about what capitalism is”); American Capitalism: New
Histories, supra note 86, at 4–5 (arguing that “it has been an advantage,
not a defect, to consider capitalism inclusively” but also conceding that it
is possible “that the new history of capitalism eventually coalesces around
a particular definition”); Moyn, supra note 123, at 55 (“[T]here is no such
thing as capitalism.”).
128. The extremely compact conception of capitalism offered here is based on
extensive conversation with Talha Syed to whom I am indebted. The
responsibility for the content is mine alone. See generally Talha Syed,
Capital as a Social Relation (draft manuscript on file with author).
129. See Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer
View 106 (1999).
130. See Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy,
Volume One 125 (Penguin Books ed. 1990).
131. See Polanyi, supra note 80, at 61.
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everything else, including necessities.132 Markets became dis-embedded
as economic relations were no longer directly grounded in other social
relationships or interests, left to their own logic and resulting in the
“running of society as the adjunct of the market” rather than the other
way around.133 Generalized and dis-embedded markets unleashed their
own dynamics: human action oriented toward the production and
accumulation of “profit”—meaning abstract value—for the purpose of
accumulation of profit.134 As this emergence of the exchange relation–
ship as “a dominant form of social intercourse” 135 unfolded in
nineteenth-century United States, the result was no less than a
revolution of all aspects of life and society, within but also far beyond
“the economy.”136 Everything including government, the social order,
the family and even the physical landscape of the land changed radically
as part of this process. The main thrust of the generalization and disembedding of markets was thus “horizontal:” all members of society
were caught in the unraveling and recreation of social relations and in
the new logic imprinted in them. Yet there was also an interlaced
“vertical” thrust: the rise of markets led to the accumulation of capital,
the emergence of wage labor, and other forms of domination137 resulting
in increasing disparities of wealth and power.138
How can we locate the history of intellectual property within this
frame? I discuss here three elements of understanding the evolution of
intellectual property as part of the rise and development of capitalism,
not meant to be exhaustive.
Most fundamentally, the history of intellectual property should be
understood as part of the process of commodification. The appearance
of the set of legal relations we call today intellectual property was, first
and foremost, part of the relentless and all-encompassing process of
expanding the commodity form, as applied to various kinds of infor–
mation. This process happened on the ground in changing practices of
132. See id.
133. Id. at 60. That is not to say, of course, that the market is or ever was a
spontaneous realm not dependent on various institutions including those
created and maintained by the state.
134. Interchange, supra note 127, at 511–12.
135. Zakim & Kornblith, supra note 97, at 1.
136. Id. at 1–2.
137. Most importantly slavery which new historians of capitalism insist must
be understood as a central part of this system rather than its antithesis.
See Beckert & Desan, supra note 86, at 325.
138. Critics of capitalism usually focus solely on its “vertical” dimension while
defenders restrict their attention to the “horizontal” one. Often missed is
how the two are closely intertwined. See Talha Syed, The Vertical and
Horizontal in Capitalism (forthcoming, on file with author).
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increasingly subjecting information to general market exchange. But it
also involved a conceptual change—a new specific way of understanding
information. Both the practice and the concept had a distinctive
structure consisting of three different conceptual elements. First, to
become a commodity, information had to become a “thing” or an object.
In premodern times, various kinds of information were understood in
fluid terms as living human knowledge, a dynamic process, or even as
an aspect of persons.139 Before information could become an object of
market exchange, a thing to be bought and sold, this dynamic character
had to be wrestled to the ground—it had to become an object. The first
phase of creating intellectual property then was constructing the
relevant informational objects. Second, these informational objects had
to be “first transformed into bars in the head and in speech before they
are exchanged for one another.”140 In other words, informational objects
had to be understood as reducible to their abstract and commensurable
exchange value and as produced in order to extract this value from any
possible market. A third and last aspect was the question of drawing
borders: what kinds of information were to be subjected to this form
and what kinds had to be left outside it? The distinctive structure of
commodified information gradually came to be embedded in the
applicable legal forms. It is this embodiment of the commodity form as
applied to information which distinguishes the unique phenomenon of
intellectual property. Information was far from completely unregulated
prior to the appearance of intellectual property, as attested by many
premodern institutional arrangements such as guild regulation of craft
secrecy, restrictions on the immigration of skilled craftsmen, patronage,
139. See, e.g., Edgar A.J. Johnson, The Mercantilist Concept of “Art” and
“Ingenious Labour,” 41 Econ. J. 234 (1931), https://academic.oup.com/ej/
article-abstract/41/Supplement_1/234/5267121?redirectedFrom=fulltext
[https://perma.cc/7UBU-L8RK]; Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship,
“Intellectual Property,” and the Origin of Patents: Notes toward a
Conceptual History, 32 Tech. & Culture 846, 870 (1991) (describing how
the concept of intellectual property emerged out of medieval guilds’ attitudes
toward craft knowledge of their members); Sherman & Bently, supra note
85, at 47 (arguing that in its premodern form the intangible “was thought
of . . . [as] a form of action or performance”); Carlo Marco Belfanti, Guilds,
Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowledge: Northern Italy during
the Early Modern Age, 45 Tech. & Culture 569, 570–71 (2004) (explaining
that in the early modern era the regulation of the circulation of technical
knowledge was closely related to controlling the movement of people). See
generally Pamela O. Long, Openness, Secrecy, Authorship: Tech–
nical Arts and the Culture of Knowledge from Antiquity to the
Renaissance (2001) (discussing the culture of authorship with a specific
focus on intellectual property).
140. Karl Marx, The Grundrisse: Fundamentals of a Critique of
Political Economy 72 (2015), (https://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/1857/grundrisse/) [https://perma.cc/F9VW-BVRE].
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and censorship. 141 What separates these and many other forms of
regulating the production and dissemination of information from the
later-coming intellectual property is exactly the commodity form.
Commodification, then, is a powerful concept for understanding the
development of the distinctly modern phenomenon of intellectual
property. At the same time, commodification was neither a preordained
uniform structure nor an unchanging, static one once appearing. The
process of development was rife with contestation and negotiation,
rather than the progressive extension of a readymade structure. Each
of the three conceptual dimensions of commodifying information gave
rise to many puzzles such as what exactly was the object of exchange,
how was its value to be measured, what exactly could be owned or
bought and sold, and what constituted interference with property
rights. There was also friction with deeply held ideological commit–
ments, most prominently various forms of aversion to ownership of
knowledge. And often there was resistance from various interested
groups who resorted to both the conceptual loose ends and
countervailing ideology. The result was specific and unique patterns of
commodifying information, patterns that were not identical in all
contexts or places and remained dynamic over time. This history
accounts for both the conceptual unity and the internal diversity of the
area of intellectual property: the field’s overarching principle is the
commodification of information while its different subfields are marked
by the different patterns of commodification as those developed
historically (with further variation within each field). The development
of these patterns is a rich vein to be mined by historians. And the story
to be told is threefold, encompassing the emergence of: the general,
distinctively modern, framework of commodifying information, i.e.,
intellectual property; the carving out of the general sub-areas within it;
and also the phenomenon of incomplete commodification. The latter
refers to the fact that, in some contexts, ideological resistance and
interest groups’ tussles produced incomplete commodification: the
demarcation of certain kinds of information as residing outside the

141. See, e.g., Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical
Perspective 20–27 (1968) (discussing the government’s involvement in
controlling what was published by printing presses); Elizabeth L.
Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change 636–82 (1979)
(examining external regulation of scientific publications through sponsorship
and censorship of religious institutions); Rose, supra note 85, at 16–17
(analyzing the patronage system and the printing privileges among guilds–
men). See generally Long, Openness, Secrecy, Authorship, supra note
139 (exploring the history of intellectual property up to the Renaissance);
Joseph Loewenstein, The Author’s Due: Printing and the Pre–
history of Copyright (2002) (examining the institutional and cultural
history of printing and discussing the origins of copyright).
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domain of commodification.142 Some examples of this include news,143
basic scientific research, 144 and what came to be known as “moral
rights” that in the continental tradition emerged as extra-territorial
islands deliberately designed to insulate certain human interests from
market commodification. 145 Again, these different patterns of
incomplete commodification, their negotiation and dynamic shift over
time, as well as their geographical migration and cross-influence, holds
promising prospects for historical exploration.
A second element of situating the history of intellectual property
within the history of capitalism is uncovering the development of how
this area came to play a constitutive role in important junctures of the
structure of modern economic relations. The rise of intellectual property
was not limited to the creation of a mechanism for the market exchange
of information as a consumer good. In various ways, intellectual
property rights acquired a deeper structural role in the organization of
economic relations. As Michael Zakim observes: “The knowledge
economy is not . . . a ‘post-industrial,’ and certainly not a ‘postcapitalist,’ development.” 146 In other words, the growth and
transformation of business in the nineteenth century was, in fact, the
first information age with “the capital of mind” playing a major role in

142. See Oren Bracha, Incomplete Commodification: Book Review of Who
Owns the News? A History of Copyright, 6 Critical Analysis L. 208,
211–12 (2019).
143. See generally Slauter, supra note 84 (arguing that the news is a primary
example of incomplete commodification by detailing the effect of copyright
in the industry); Brauneis, supra note 83 (discussing the parallels of the
shift of the requirement of originality as it relates to copyright to the
attempts to obtain legal protection for the news).
144. See generally Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of
History, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 257 (2013) (analyzing the history of the
patentability of genetic material and laws of nature). See also Joseph M.
Gabriel, Medical Monopoly: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Origins of the Modern Pharmaceutical Industry 2 (2014)
(describing how the American pharmaceutical industry shifted from resis–
tance to an embrace of patents).
145. See Peter Baldwin, The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of
Trans-Atlantic Battle 126–98 (2014) (describing the rise of moral
rights in continental Europe and Anglo-American resistance). In fact, the
story is more complex than moral rights as simply an area of resistance
to commodification. A central feature of the idea of moral rights is placing
the protection of certain human interests in creativity outside the realm
of market exchange. At the same time, however, the understanding of
these human interests and the framework for their protection take exactly
the forms characteristic of a market society.
146. Michael Zakim, Intellectual Property in the Age of Capital, 12
Theoretical Inquiries L.F. 6, 7 (2011).
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it. 147 This was true of applied knowledge pertaining to the material
world that was the basis of the physical infrastructure of capitalism:
everything from innovations such as railroads, telegraphy, and
telephony that constituted the transportation and communication
revolutions, to the designs of the new machines and chemical processes
that powered factories.148 It was also true of new knowledge of manip–
ulating the social and commercial spheres such as accounting and filing
systems, business statistics, or financing schemes that constituted the
business revolution.149 Ownership under intellectual property rights was
potentially relevant for all of those infrastructural assets. In some cases,
this meant straightforward extension of proprietary rights, most
commonly patents and trade secrets.150 Other cases, such as business
statistics 151 or accounting systems, 152 involved struggles, sometimes
resulting in incomplete commodification. The point is that intellectual
property rights came to play a structural role on this deeper level of the
system’s knowledge infrastructure. Commodification of information
unfolded not just with respect to consumer markets but also as a
regulative principle of the system’s infrastructure.
Intellectual property rights also played a structural role with
respect to business organization. Until after the Civil War, assignment
of patent shares played a major role in structuring business partnership
around innovative technologies. 153 In the absence of general incor–
147. Id.
148. See generally George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation
Revolution, 1815–1860 (1951) (analyzing the changes in transportation
infrastructure in the United States during the mid-1800s); Brooke Hindle
& Stephen Lubar, Engines of Change: The American Industrial
Revolution, 1790–1860 (1986) (discussing the importance of techno–
logical transfer at the turn of the nineteenth century); Walter Licht,
Industrializing America: The Nineteenth Century (1995) (analyzing
industrialization both as a product and as an agent of change); Richard
R. John, Network Nation: Inventing American Telecommun–
ication (2010) (discussing how early access to telephone networks spread).
149. See Thomas C. Cochran, The Business Revolution, 79 Am. Hist. Rev.
1449, 1449–50, 1456 (1974); Michael Zakim, Producing Capitalism: The
Clerk at Work, in Capitalism Takes Command, supra note 97, at 223–
24.
150. See Zakim, supra note 146, at 7; Beauchamp, supra note 144, at 282.
151. See, e.g., Slauter, supra note 84, at 117–42 (examining the ability to
protect by copyright market news and business statistics).
152. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening
the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention, in Intellectual
Property Stories, supra note 37 at 159–94.
153. See generally Lamoreaux et al., supra note 82 (analyzing nineteenth-century
patent data and motivations for patenting); Adam Mossoff, Patent
Licensing and Secondary Markets in the Nineteenth Century, 22 Geo.
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poration that became available only around the mid-century, assigning
patent shares was the direct vehicle for molding business structure.154
Similarly, geographical licensing supplied the foundations for a form of
territorial franchising in an age where nation-wide operation by a single
business entity was rare.155 Somewhat later, patent pools that created
schemes for licensing a multitude of rights necessary for particular
technologies began to play a broader organizational role in shaping and
regulating the operation of entire industries.156 Both share-assignments
and pools, rather than limited to being mechanisms for overcoming
transaction costs in transferring ownership or permissions from sellers
to buyers, were more fundamental important instruments of structuring
business. Around the turn of the twentieth century, business
organization mushroomed dramatically in scope and scale with the
corporate R&D lab becoming a central mode of innovation.157 In this
context, patents, which now were often held in portfolios, became
instruments of corporate security.158 Firms used such portfolios to try
to obtain predictability and “rationality,” draw the borderlines of their
zones of operation and negotiate industry-wide arrangements.159 As a
top official of an AT&T subsidiary put it in 1926, referring to patent
licensing arrangements:

Mason L. Rev. 959 (2015) (discussing patent licensing business models
throughout the nineteenth century).
154. See Robert Merges, American Patent Law: A Business and
Economic History (forthcoming) (manuscript at chapter 3).
155. See Sean M. O’Connor, Origins of Patent Exhaustion: Jacksonian Politics,
“Patent Farming,” and the Basis of the Bargain 8 (U. Wash. Sch. L.
Research Paper No. 2017-05), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920738 [https://
perma.cc/D6B5-U6GL].
156. See generally Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American
Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 Ariz. L. Rev.
165 (2011) (detailing the story of the first patent pool and how it affected
the overall business). See Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 280–
83 (outlining several early patent pools).
157. See generally Leonard S. Reich, The Making of American Industrial
Research: Science and Business at GE and Bell, 1876–1926 (1985)
(discussing the formation of industrial research in the United States); Louis
Galambos, The American Economy and the Reorganization of the Sources
of Knowledge, in The Organization of Knowledge in Modern
America, 1860–1920, at 269–84 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss, eds.
1979).
158. See David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and
the Rise of Corporate Capitalism 10 (1977); Bracha, Owning
Ideas, supra note 24, at 276–84.
159. See Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 24, at 274, 282.
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The regulation of the relationship between two such large
interests as the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. and the
General Electric Co. and the prevention of invasion of their
respective fields is accomplished by mutual adjustment within “no
man’s land” where the offensive of the parties as related to these
competitive activities is recognized as a natural defense against
invasion of the major fields.160

In copyright, the structural role of rights in business organization
was developed later. As relevant industries as well as the applicable
copyright framework grew more complex, this structural role became
more significant. One early example is the music industry, where early
in the twentieth century right portfolios were the vehicle of maneuvers
to try to control the industry161 and where later organizational patterns
of businesses and intermediaries came to revolve around the copyright
framework.
One last structural role of intellectual property worth mentioning
here pertains to trademark law. In this area, the structural role with
respect to general patterns of economic activity is exactly the line
dividing traditional trademark law as a form of anti-fraud protection
from its gradual propertization, meaning its becoming truly a branch
of intellectual property (which is still contested even today). 162
Goodwill, that elusive asset that shrewd businessmen began to sell and
license around the mid-nineteenth century,163 is a double abstraction. It
is the commodification of business success. Commodification took here
its usual two-step course: first, reducing the dynamic and evanescent
character of everything that made a business successful into an object,
securing it in place by mooring it to a symbol; then, making this new
object the subject of market exchange. Through the market exchange
of a new object called goodwill, commodification came to be applied not
only to informational consumer goods and various elements of
capitalism’s infrastructure, but to business success itself. Trademark
law built around goodwill supplied the constitutive legal forms.
The somewhat younger cousin of goodwill—the brand—and its
legal form further extended this process to encompass a particular key
160. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Investigation of the Telephone Industry
in the United States, H.R. Doc No. 340, at 210 (1st Sess. 1939).
161. See Stuart Banner, American Property: A History of How, Why, and
What We Own 118 (2011); Gerardo Con Díaz, Encoding Music:
Perforated Paper, Copyright Law, and the Legibility of Code, 1880–1908,
71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 627, 639–40 (2020).
162. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of
Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L.R. 547, 589–92 (2006).
163. See id., at 576–79; see also Adam Mossoff, Trademark as a Property
Right, 107 Ky. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2018).
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feature of business success: the power to cultivate and channel human
desire. To succeed, businesses needed to harness human desire to buy.
A major development of capitalism, embodied in the rise of the adver–
tisement industry, was erecting a systematic mechanism for cultivating
and channeling preferences or “needs.”164 Brands emerged as semiotic
receptacles for the product of this mechanism: petrified crystals
capturing and mooring down the dynamic process of channeling human
desire. The (incomplete) extension of trademark law to protect the
value of brands and facilitate their market exchange was the process of
commodifying the value of molded human desire as embodying selling
power.165 Commodifying selling power as captured by semiotic commer–
cial devices laid, in turn, the foundation for yet another business
organization form heavily reliant on intellectual property: the modern
franchise.166
The third distinctive aspect of intellectual property studied as part
of the history of capitalism is conceptual. The context of ownership of
information had been one where basic latent assumptions characteristic
of a market society that usually remain silent were often challenged,
wrestled with, or at least momentarily forced to the surface. In other
words, ownership of information is where naturalization tends to burst
at the seams. The reason for this is that ownership of intangibles
destabilizes one widespread strategy of naturalization, meaning:
physicalization. Physicalization is the representation of a social relation
between people as a physical (and hence “natural”) relation between
things or between things and people. 167 Property is an area where
164. See Daniel Pope, The Making of Modern Advertising 234 (1983)
(quoting Edwin G. Dexter, The Psychology of Advertising, 48 Printers’
Ink, no. 8, Aug. 24, 1904, at 14) (“The modern advertisement is not
intended for the man who wants the things already . . . . It’s for the one
who don’t [sic] in order to make him.”).
165. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
Harv. L. Rev. 813, 819 (1927) (observing that “[t]he mark actually sells
the goods”).
166. See Milton Handler, Franchising and Business Independence, in The
Economics of Antitrust: Competition and Monopoly 153 (Richard
E. Low ed. 1968) (noting that “[t]he central element of most franchises of
entire enterprises is a license granted the franchisee to use the franchisor’s
trademark or trade name”).
167. Anna di Robliant & Talha Syed, Property’s Building Blocks: Hohfeld in
Europe and Beyond, in The Legacy of Wesley Hohfeld: Edited
Major Works, Select Personal Papers, and Original
Commentaries 4 (Shyam Balganesh, Ted Sichelman & Henry E. Smith
eds.) (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3149768 [https://perma.cc/P7ZC-JKXW] (expounding the dephysicalized
notion of property as “always and only” a social relation as one, indeed, the
foundational, of three components of a fully dereified conception of
property); Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and
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physicalization abounds, where legal relations between people masquer–
ade as physical relations between people and things.168 But this has
never worked smoothly with intellectual property. As the name implies,
intellectual property, at least once understood as such, wears its nonphysicalism on its sleeve. In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Jr., these are rights “in vacuo” that create “a prohibition of conduct
remote from the persons or tangibles of the party having the right.”169
And this obvious intangibility of the object of property tended to
disrupt the disguise of the property relation as a physical one. The
upshot of this dynamic was that in some moments intellectual
property’s disruption of the physicalist naturalization extended to all
property rights170 and indeed to all legal relations.171 This is not to say
that physicalization has ever been banished from the area of intellectual
property. Nevertheless, it is less stable and more prone for disruption
in the context of ownership of information. Thus, intellectual property
has been an area where occasionally a window had opened offering a
view beyond at least some of the naturalizing assumptions of a market
society and forcing participants to wrestle with the questions that then
came into view. It is therefore an opportune area of study for the
historian of capitalism.
The above are three reasons why there is a remarkable fit between
the frame of the history of capitalism—properly understood—and the
subject of intellectual property. First, the history of intellectual
Its Relationship to Modern Legal Thought, 35 Buff. L. Rev. 871, 881 n.12
(1986) (describing physicalization as a “reification of rights”).
168. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 21 (1913) (discussing the
confusions that derive from the “association of ideas involved in the two
sets of relations—the physical and the mental on the one hand, and the
purely legal on the other”); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 720
(1917) (referring to “loose and misleading usages” in law and explaining
that “[a] right in rem is not a right ‘against a thing’”).
169. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes,
J., concurring). See also Talha Syed, Reconstructing Patent Eligibility, 70
Am. Un. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing “physicalist miscon–
ceptions” in patent law).
170. See Horwitz, supra note 21, at 145–46 (referring to the dephysicalization
of property); Syed, supra note 169 (tracing the distinct historical and
conceptual roles played by property in intangibles and the understanding
of property as a social relation in the emergence and status of the modern
theory of property). See also Oren Bracha, Give Us Back Our Tragedy:
Nonrivalry in Intellectual Property Law and Policy, 19 Theoretical Inq.
L. 633, 669 (2018) (describing the challenge posed by property in
intangibles to dominant theory of property both historically and today).
171. See Hohfeld, supra note 168, at 20 (emphasizing the importance of
“differentiating purely legal relations from the physical and mental facts
that call such relations into being”).
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property is a fascinating case study of capitalism’s basic unit:
commodification. It demonstrates both the general logic and how the
specific context in which it unfolds matters a great deal. Second, in
various ways, intellectual property has played an important structural
role in the consolidation and development of capitalist economic
organization. Finally, intellectual property is a context where some of
the naturalizing assumptions of a capitalist society, at least in some
specific moments, tend to float to the surface and be laid bare to
contend with, both for the historical actor and the historian. Other
reasons for this remarkable fit may occur to the reader.
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